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Abstract
This paper examines the tax treatment of intangibles in Canada and recent developments
internationally. It suggests that the special features of intangibles and the rapid rise of intangibles
as value-drivers in the global economy may render existing tax rules inadequate in defining
Canada’s tax base and/or competing for investment in research and development in Canada.
Recent developments at the international level (such as the BEPS Project) and national level
(such as US 2018 tax reform and changes in Japan, UK and China to implement BEPS
recommendations) may point to some directions for Canada to consider.

Keywords: intangibles, BEPS, transfer pricing, digital taxation, Patent Box; GILTI; FDII;
BEAT; international minimum tax; value creation
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the age of innovation, digitization or knowledge-economy, intangibles are increasingly
important value-drivers for corporations. For example, the portion of intangible assets in the
market value of the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index is 91% in 2019, rose from 17% in 1975,
32% in 1985, 68% in 1995 and 80% in 2005. 1 In Europe and the United States, intangible
investment overtook tangible investment in the global financial crisis in 2008. 2 In Canada, total
investment in intangibles has grown more rapidly than total investment in tangibles over time, 3
but Canada lags behind the United States. 4
Conceptually, intangibles can be intellectual property, such as patents, copyrights and trademarks
as well as goodwill, brand recognition, know-how, licenses, data, etc. For the lack of a statutory
definition in the Income Tax Act, 5 one can perhaps regard anything of value that is not tangible
as an intangible for general purposes. 6 Intangibles differ from tangible assets in terms of
scalability, 7 sunkenness, 8 uniqueness 9 and difficulty in valuation.. These features make the
intangibles or digital economy different from the traditional economy and challenge the
application of tax laws that were developed during the industrial era.
Recent debates about the taxation of intangibles and digital economy have centred on two basic
questions:
1. Are the existing rules on the inter-nation allocation of taxing rights adequate in regard to
value created by intangibles (the “tax base” question), and
2. To what extent can nation states engage in tax competition to retain or attract income
from intangibles to their jurisdiction (the “tax competition” question)?
The tax base question concerns with the definition of tax jurisdiction of a country, rules on the
deduction of expenditures on developing or acquiring intangibles, rules on the taxation of income
from intangibles, transfer pricing rules and other base-protection rules. The tax competition
question concerns with the use of tax incentives to attract activities that create/develop
intangibles or exploit the value of intangibles.
As a result of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project launched in
2013, a value-creation paradigm has emerged, aiming to tax business profits in the country where
economic activities occur and value is created. This paradigm has guided the reform measures
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adopted in BEPS Actions 8-10 on transfer pricing and influenced the proposals to address the tax
challenges arising in the digital economy. However, this value-creation paradigm is controversial
and its application uncertain. This is particularly the case with respect to intangibles owing to the
inherent difficulty in determining the value of intangibles and where value is created. There is no
international consensus yet.
Some countries have adopted unilateral measures to address the taxation of intangibles. For
example, the United States introduced the GILTI (global intangible low tax income), FDII
(foreign-derived intangible income) and BEAT (base erosion anti-abuse tax) rules as part of the
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) enacted in 2017. Many European countries have introduced
“patent box” regimes to offer preferential tax treatment of income from patent and patent-like
intangibles. 10 The United Kingdom amended rules on the recognition of cost of fixed intangible
assets and patent box and incorporated OECD Guidelines. 11 Through the process of
implementation of BEPS measures, China has updated its transfer pricing rules to emphasize a
contribution-based analysis in determining the value of intangibles and the location of value
creation, 12 and Japan has adopted the OECD approach to hard-to-value intangibles. 13
The Act does not really specifically address intangibles. As such, general tax law and policies
apply to intangibles. Canada seems to lag behind many of its peers in the OECD in this respect.
Even in the area of transfer pricing where section 247 of the Act is purportedly consistent with
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, at least the 1995 version of the guidelines, it is
questionable whether the subsequent versions should influence the interpretation of section 247.
Some consider these subsequent guidelines to have limited effect on Canadian law in the absence
of legislative amendment, while the Canada Revenue Agency (“CRA”) and the government of
Canada were of the view that such legislative amendment was not necessary in general. 14
This paper reviews the Canadian taxation of intangibles and canvasses major recent
developments at an international level and selected country level. It urges Canada not to be
complacent with the status quo and offers some ideas for moving forward.
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2. INTANGIBLES: DEFINITION AND SPECIAL FEATURES
2.1 Definition
The term “intangibles” or “intangible property” is not defined in the Act. The definition of
“property” in subsection 248(1) says that property can be intangible. “In principle, it does not
matter whether an “intangible” is legally protected, as long as it and the realization of its value
would be recognized for purposes of computing income under the Act.” 15 For purposes of
specific provisions of the Act, specific types of intangibles are mentioned. For example, for the
capital cost allowance rules under paragraph 20(1)(a), goodwill, license and farm quota are
treated as assets in Class 14.1, while a patent, franchise, concession or license fall into Class 14,
computer software is in class 12. Similarly, paragraph 212(1)(d) mentions “invention, tradename, patent, trade-mark, design or model, plan, secret formula, process” and “information
concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience” in specifying whether the payment
for the right, or the right to use, these items are subject to Canadian withholding tax.
The transfer pricing provision in section 247 makes no explicit reference to intangibles. The
CRA Information Circular IC 87-2R- International Transfer Pricing (September 7, 1999), which
was stated to be consistent with the 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (the 1995 OECD Guidelines), addresses “intangible
property” issues in Part 5 without offering a definition of this term. The circular “presumes the
existence of a taxable object called “intangible property” and then discusses the application of
the arm’s length standard to it. 16
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2017) 17 states in para.6.6:
[T]he word “intangible” is intended to address something which is not a physical asset or
a financial asset, which is capable of being owned or controlled for use in commercial
activities, and whose use or transfer would be compensated had it occurred in a
transaction between independent parties in comparable circumstances. Rather than
focusing on accounting or legal definitions, the thrust of a transfer pricing analysis in a
case involving intangibles should be the determination of the conditions that would be
agreed upon between independent parties for a comparable transaction.
The above definition presumes that an intangible is an asset, but not necessarily in a legal or
accounting sense. It defines intangibles in a negative manner by excluding “physical asset” and
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“financial” asset. It emphasizes, however, that the asset must be “capable of being owned or
controlled for use in commercial activities” and has market value.
The US took a different approach. Instead of defining intangibles, for purpose of GILTI and
FDII rules, intangible income is deemed to be corporate income that exceeds a deemed rate of
return on tangible assets. 18

2.2 Categories and Development of Intangibles
Intangibles can be described and classified in various ways, such as “trade intangibles”,
“marketing intangibles”, “soft intangibles” and “hard intangibles”, “routine and non-routine
intangibles”, “unique and valuable” intangibles, or “hard-to-value intangibles”. 19 The OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines describe the following kinds of intangibles: patents, know-how and
trade secrets; trademarks, trade names and brands; licenses and similar limited rights in
intangibles; goodwill and ongoing concern value, and clarify that group synergies and market
specific characteristics are not intangibles as they are not capable of being owned or controlled
by an enterprise. 20 Intangibles can also be categorized as marketing related (e.g., trademarks),
customer-related (e.g., customer lists), artistic-related (e.g., literary works), technology-based
(e.g., patents) or contract-based (e.g., license or franchise).
Some intangibles are developed in the ordinary course of carrying on business. Examples are
brand recognition, goodwill and know-how. Other intangibles require specific development, such
as copyrights, patents and trademark and are protected by specific intellectual property
legislation. Data, especially the insights provided through applying analytics and artificial
intelligence (AI) to data is a critically valuable input to all areas of business. For digital
businesses, user data is critical to their success. Data is often coupled with the use of other
intangible assets and the ability to sell without being physically present. Customer interfaces or
platforms that use digital enablers, predictive analytical tools and AI are valuable intangibles in a
business sense.

2.3 Monetization of intangibles
The value of an intangible can be monetized or realized through a transfer (disposition) of the
intangible or licensing of the right to use the intangible on a stand-alone basis or as part of a
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composite transaction (such as a merger or acquisition and restructuring). The value of
intangibles can also be realized through the sale of goods and/or services with embedded
intangibles. 21 According to a WIPO study, intangibles accounted for over 30% of the value of
manufactured goods sold throughout 2000-2014, and income from intangibles increased by 75
per cent from 2000 to 2014 in real terms. 22 It was also found that the share of intangibles in the
value of final goods increased more rapidly in durable goods (machinery and equipment
products) than non-durable products. 23
For tax purposes, income attributable to intangibles is often treated differently from the sale of
goods or services. In the case of embedded intangibles, the challenge is to disaggregate the value
of a sale of goods/services transaction to reveal the portion attributable to intangibles, or in other
words, to make the invisible intangible income visible for tax purposes.

2.5 Valuation
Valuation of intangibles is important for tax purposes. However, valuation is often difficult,
especially in transactions between members of the same corporate group. For transfer pricing
purposes, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2017) acknowledge the use of income-based
valuation techniques, “especially those premised on the calculation of the discounted value of
projected future income streams or cash flows derived from the exploitation of the intangible
being valued” 24 and “discourage” the use of cost of development technique. 25 If there is a fair
market value, the market approach is obviously the best.

3. CANADIAN TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES
The Act does not have a specific regime for intangibles. As such, basic tax principles apply to
the characterization of transactions involving intangibles as giving rise to a revenue or capital
amount, the deductibility of cost of developing or acquiring intangibles, the timing of deduction,
and valuation. In the case of cross-border transactions, the general rules governing tax
jurisdiction, withholding taxes, foreign accrual property income (FAPI) rules and transfer pricing
apply to transactions involving intangibles. In addition, the Act offers “generous” incentives for
conducting research and development in Canada, 26 but no incentives for exploiting intangibles in
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Canada. What follows is a brief discussion of the salient aspects of the Act regarding intangibles
in cross-border situations.

3.1 Characterization and Timing Rules
Paragraphs 12(1)(g) and 212(1)(d) of the Act treat payments based on production or use or any
payments that are similar in nature to rent or royalties as income. Both provisions disregard the
contractual arrangement or characterization. Outside these two provisions, the characterization of
an amount as on revenue (or income) or capital account is governed by general principles. 27 The
characterization is relatively straightforward in the case of intellectual property, such as patents,
trademarks and copyrights and not so in the case of other intangibles. For example, a payment
for acquiring goodwill was considered to be on capital account in Gifford. 28 Similarly, the cost of
acquiring a franchising business, including trademarks, know-how and goodwill was considered
to be on capital account in Services Farmico Inc. 29 On the other hand, the cost of obtaining a
trademark registration or developing goodwill are generally on revenue account and currently
deductible. The sale of know-how or secret process is generally on income account. 30
The timing of recognition of the cost of intangibles or income of intangibles is also governed by
general rules. For example, the cost of intangibles that is on capital account is deductible under
the capital cost allowance regime. 31 The rate of depreciation is prescribed to be 5% for Class
14.1 property (goodwill), 25% for Class 44 property (patent, right to use patented information for
a limited or unlimited period) and apportioned over the life of Class 14 property (patent,
franchise, concession or license for a limited period in respect of property). The cost of
developing intangibles on revenue account are deductible when it is incurred. Section 37 of the
Act permits a taxpayer carrying on business to deduct certain expenditures made in respect of
scientific research and experimental development (SR&ED) which might otherwise not be
deductible under the general rules. Income from transferring or licensing intangibles is taxable
when it is received or receivable under paragraph 12(1)(g) or paid or credited to a non-resident
taxpayer under paragraph 212(1)(d).

9

3.2 Cross-border Income from Intangibles
Under the Act, residents are taxable on their domestic and foreign income and non-residents are
taxable on their Canadian income. 32 In effect, income from intangibles (e.g., royalty) is subject
to tax in Canada when Canada is a residence country or source country.
In the case of Canadian residents earning foreign-source royalty income, the income may be
subject to withholding tax in the source country. Such withholding tax is generally creditable
against Canadian tax otherwise payable. 33 However, if foreign-source royalty is earned by a
Canadian resident corporation through its foreign affiliate, such income is, in effect, exempt from
Canadian tax when it is earned by the foreign affiliate and when it is distributed to the Canadian
resident in the form of dividends. 34 In other words, as long as the intangibles are exploited
outside Canada and used in carrying on an active business in, and by a resident of, a designated
treaty country, the income is free from Canadian tax at the corporate level (personal taxes on
distributions remain applicable, etc.)..
In the case of non-residents receiving royalties or similar income from intangibles from a
Canadian resident, the payment is subject to a 25% gross-basis withholding tax (which is
reduced by an applicable tax treaty). 35 This withholding tax applies even when the payer is a
non-resident of Canada as long as the payment is deductible in computing income attributable to
a Canadian permanent establishment of the non-resident. 36 The underlying principle is that
income from intangibles is taxable at source – where it is used. This principle is consistent with
the new nomenclature –value creation principle (i.e., taxation of profits where value is created)
and the policy underlying the U.S. BEAT rules.

3.3 Transfer pricing
Canadian-based or foreign-based MNEs develop and exploit intangibles through transfer pricing
arrangements, such as cost sharing arrangement, contract research and development, transfer of
intangibles to a central entity, related-party licensing or the sale of goods or provision of services
with embedded intangibles. The facts of each of the recent transfer pricing cases reveal the role
of intangibles as value-drivers, namely: tradename, design and technology to manufacture
aluminum window products in Marzen Artistic Aluminum Ltd.; 37 know-how, secret process and
name recognition and customer list, etc. in the business of distribution of pharmaceutical
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medicine products and provision of hospital software technology in McKesson; 38group synergy
and name recognition in General Electric Capital Canada; 39 patent, trademark, processes and
know-how in Glaxo; 40 and license to mine uranium, patent, process and technology related to
mining, milling of uranium and production of fuel assemblies in Cameco. 41
Section 247 of the Act was enacted in 1997 to largely reflect the 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines. The CRA generally adheres to these guidelines. The charging rule in subsection
247(2) does not refer to the word “price.” The courts stated that “the statutory objective
underlying paragraphs 247(2)(a) and (c) of the Act is to prevent the avoidance of tax resulting
from price distortions which can arise in the context of non-arm’s length relationships by reason
of the community of interest shared by related parties” 42 and the Act “calls for the elimination of
all the distortions that arise in any given transaction between related parties”. 43 Nevertheless,
Canadian courts have generally interpreted section 247 as providing for an exercise of finding
arm’s length prices.
In Glaxo, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that transfer pricing is not an exact
science and said that in determining the arm’s length price the interest of each party to the nonarm’s length transaction should be considered. 44 Among the transfer pricing methods sanctioned
by the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (i.e., comparable uncontrolled price or CUP, resale
price, cost plus, transactional net margin method or TNMM, and profit split), CUP has been used
the most. The issue of intangibles or residual profit arising from intangibles has not been
considered as such in any of the cases, although in Glaxo the reasoning in part was that the
taxpayer was reasonably paying for the business relationship and future business opportunities to
participate in marketing branded pharmaceutical products.
The CRA recognizes the difficulty in valuing unique intangibles or applying one-sided transfer
pricing methods (CUP, resale, cost plus and TNMM) to determine an arm’s length result. On
CRA’s view, “in most cases, both the supplier and the recipient share the risks and the benefits
associated with using an intangible” 45 and arm’s length pricing for the transfer of intangible
property must take into account the perspective of both parties. 46 The CRA also recognizes that
transfer pricing methods that depend on comparable transactions between arm’s length parties
may be inappropriate for unique or highly valuable intangibles. A profit split method may be the
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most appropriate. 47 However, the CRA provides no guidance on special comparability factors for
intangibles.
One of the controversial issues is the interpretation of paragraphs 247(2)(b)/(d) and whether, and
if so, when and how a transaction can be recharacterized or substituted by an alternative
transaction. Since the general approach adopted by Canadian courts is to recognize a taxpayer’s
transaction (typically as defined by contracts) as opposed to the economic or business substance
of the transaction, 48 recharacterization or substitution requires explicit legislative stipulation.
Some may think that paragraphs 247(2)(b)/(d) provide such stipulation, but the courts have not
given these provisions such a reading. In Cameco, the Tax Court opined that that the “application
of the extraordinary remedy in paragraphs 247(2)(b) and (d) is neither warranted nor appropriate
in the circumstances” where the non-arm’s length transaction may be unique but are
“commercially rational.” 49

3.4 Preferential Tax Regimes
The Act provides for generous tax incentives to support research and development in Canada, 50
but none for owning and exploiting intangibles in Canada. 51 Canada does not have a patent
boxregime. 52 On the contrary, the way in which the transfer pricing rules have been interpreted
by the courts seems to suggest an implicit incentive for companies to develop intangibles in
Canada aided by the general tax incentives and then transfer the intangibles resulted from such
R&D to an offshore entity and avoid future Canadian taxation, subject to an exit tax on transfer.
It can also be suggested that the Act provides for another implicit incentive to Canadian
corporations who exploit Canadian developed intangibles offshore through the exempt dividend
regime and the FAPI regime. 53
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TAX REFORMS ELSEWHERE

While the Canadian taxation of intangibles has remained more or less unchanged, the rest of the
world is moving fast in search of new directions and basis for global solutions in the face of a
rising, intangible and digital economy. This section briefly reviews the major reforms at the
international level and selected country level.
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4.1 The G20/OECD BEPS Project
4.1.1 The Value Creation Paradigm
The BEPS Project’s stated goal is to “revise the rules to align them to developments in the world
economy, and ensure that profits are taxed where economic activities are carried out and value is
created.” 54 This has been regarded as introducing the value creation paradigm. 55 “The
ascendency of the value creation principle has been remarkable, as has its influence.” 56 The
G20/OECD BEPS Project is oriented according to this paradigm. The value creation paradigm
can be understood to function as both a “negative” principle and a “positive” principle.
As a “negative” principle, value creation underlies the anti-avoidance measures –income should
not be allocated to an entity in a low-tax country by MNEs through internal contracts or legal
fictions unless value or profit is created there. It functions as a negative souring rule. For
example, in the case of “cash box” or “IP box” situations where a central entity in a MNE group
that provides financing or holds the intangibles, the profit attributable to the cash box or IP box
should reflect the actual value created by the entity, not the amount contractually allocated to it
by the MNE. To put it differently, profits should not be sourced to the cash box or IP box beyond
the economic value created by its functions, assets or risks assumed. This is highlighted in the
BEPS Final Reports on Actions 8-10 on transfer pricing (BEPS Report on Actions 8-10 puts
more weight on functions than assets.
As a “positive” principle, value creation assigns taxing rights, which may not exist under the
existing international tax regime, to the country where value is created. This is most notable in
the debates about digital taxation and whether users/customers of digital businesses create value
and business profits should be allocated to the country where users/customers are. The technical
debates about digital economic presence or digital permanent establishment are purportedly
animated by the value creation paradigm, although it seems that increasingly the focus is shifting
toward a formulary approach that puts a greater emphasis on revenues. Ultimately, a
monetization transaction is a value exchange, not a value creation, so a focus on revenues shifts
the principle.
The concept of value creation is vague and difficult to be translated into tax rules. There is no
international agreement on where value is created in many cases. And yet, it can be argued that
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as an ideal, value creation is consistent with the principle of “economic allegiance” that has
shaped the international tax system since the 1920s as well as the arm’s length principle that
underlies the transfer pricing rules. 57
4.1.2 Transfer Pricing Treatment of Intangibles: BEPS Actions 8-10
The divorce between where value or profit is created and where profit is taxed has been a source
of concern and conflict for many years. 58 The difficulty lies in, among others, the economic
features of intangibles, the rising role of intangibles in the global value chain, and the practice of
interpreting the arm’s length principle to respect contractual allocations of rights and
corresponding profits to intermediary entities located in nil-or-low-tax jurisdictions. For
example, developing intangibles is often time-consuming, risky and capital-intensive. If the
development activity is successful, the intangible created or developed can be transferred to an
intermediary for relatively low prices and returns to the transferee could be large in comparison
to the price paid. Moreover, the intangible may be owned legally by an intermediary entity from
the outset, and its development may be contracted to a related entity for a price for services.
Under the comparability analysis and the CUP method, the low transfer prices or cost-based
service prices would be hard for the tax authorities to challenge. As a result, the legal owner of
the intangible whose only contribution to the value of the intangible is to acquire it or fund its
development may derive the income from the exploitation of the intangible that could be many
multiples of the transfer price or services price paid. The future income is not linked to the cost
of development or creation of the intangible. BEPS Actions 8-10 sought to address some of these
issues, including ownership and entitlement to income from intangibles, valuation of intangibles,
hard-to-value intangibles, cost contribution arrangements, group synergies, and profit split.
Without explicitly lifting the corporate veil or ignoring internal contracts, 59 the BEPS Report on
Actions 8-10 effectively splits entitlement to intangible income between the formal legal owner
(the intermediary or IP Box) and economic owners (entities that perform functions, use assets
and control or assume risks related to the creation of intangible value). The Report emphasizes
that the ownership of intangibles based on contracts and the conduct of the parties is the starting
point in transfer pricing analysis, but not necessarily the end point. 60 The actual functions
performed, assets used and risks controlled or assumed in developing intangibles play a central
role in sharing income from the exploitation of the intangibles.
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To address the difficulties in finding comparables for transactions involving intangibles, the
BEPS Report on Actions 8-10 allows the use of economic valuation techniques that go beyond
the five transfer pricing methods. 61 One such technique is the discounted value of projected
future cash flows. In the case of hard-to-value intangibles, most valuable intangibles may fall
into this category, the Report authorizes tax administrations to take post-transfer results into
account in determining the transfer prices in certain circumstances. 62 A taxpayer can challenge
the usefulness of post-transaction information by, among other things, demonstrating that the
differences between actual outcomes and the projections used can be ascribed to unforeseeable
events. 63
Corporate group synergies may or may not be intangible and are typically not attributable to any
specific transaction. Synergistic profit arises from deliberate concerted group actions and is a
source of a MNE’s residual profit (i.e., profit not attributable to any specific factor of
production). The BEPS Report on Actions 8-10 states that such profit ought to be identified and
allocated to those members of the MNE group whose functions or assets give rise to the
synergies in proportion to their contribution to the synergy. 64 This can be achieved through
reflecting the synergies in comparability adjustments so that the effects of the synergies on prices
can be determined.
The BEPS Report on Actions 8-10 recognizes the importance of profit splits and global value
chains, but does not provide detailed guidance, owing to the time constraint, presumably. The
Inclusive Framework of BEPS published Revised Guidance on the Application of the
Transactional Profit Split Method in 2018 (2018 Revised Guidance). Its assumption is that arm’s
length parties split profits on the basis of their relative contributions to the creation of those
profits. The Revised Guidance clarifies and significantly expands the guidance on when a profit
split method may be the most appropriate method. It describes that the presence of one or more
of the following indicators may be relevant: each party makes unique and valuable contributions;
the business operations are highly integrated such that the contributions of the parties cannot be
reliably evaluated in isolation from each other; and the parties share the assumption of
economically significant risks, or separately assume closely related risks. It cautions that lacking
comparables alone does not justify the use of the profit split method. Profit splitting factors can
be based on: assets or capital (e.g. operating assets, fixed assets such as production assets, retail

15
assets, IT assets, intangibles); costs (e.g. relative spending and/or investment in key areas such as
research and development, engineering, marketing); 65 and other factors, such as incremental
sales, or employee compensation (relating to the individuals involved in the key functions that
generate value to the transaction, for example in relation to the global trading of financial
instruments).
The country-by-country reporting under BEPS Action 13 may provide the necessary information
and data for transfer pricing analysis and the application of the profit split method, although that
is not its stated purpose. “In addition to the Local File, which should contain a detailed
functional analysis of the taxpayer and its relevant associated enterprises, the MNE group’s
Master File might be a useful source of information relevant to the determination of appropriate
profit splitting factors,” such as “information on the important drivers of business profit, the
principal contributions to value creation by entities within the group, and key group
intangibles.” 66
The BEPS Report on Actions 8-10, which have been incorporated in the 2017 OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines and the Revised Guidance in 2018 retain the transactional approach to
applying the profit split method. They also continue to formally reject any formulary
apportionment of firm profit. The identification of a specific transaction involving intangibles
remains a critical preliminary step:
The accurate delineation of the actual transaction will be important in determining
whether a transactional profit split is potentially applicable. This process should have
regard to the commercial and financial relations between the associated enterprises,
including an analysis of what each party to the transaction does, and the context in which
the controlled transactions take place. 67
Intangibles embedded in goods or services could also in theory be disaggregated for transfer
pricing analysis. In Example 24, the BEPS Report on Actions 8-10 illustrates that a software
development consulting contract has two components: services and the proprietary rights in the
software developed. The transfer of goodwill is often embedded in a restructuring transaction.
However, no effort is made to disaggregate intangible elements of, say, branded goods.
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4.1.3 Intangibles and Digital Taxation: Inclusive Framework on BEPS
Intangibles drive the digital transformation of the economy. Digitized business models differ
from traditional business models in three key respects: scale without mass, heavy reliance on
intangible assets, and the importance of data, user participation and their synergies with
intangible assets. 68 Measured by existing tax rules, income of global digital businesses can be
located nowhere and everywhere, creating issues of taxing rights allocation, intern-nation tax
competition and stateless income. BEPS Action 1 aimed at tackling these challenges. However,
because these challenges “are emblematic of wider vulnerabilities in the international tax
system” they “cannot be addressed by small scale reforms but rather ask for a more fundamental
reconsideration.” 69 Solution requires comprehensive work that covers the overall allocation of
taxing rights through revised profit allocation rules and revised nexus rules, as well as anti-BEPS
rules.
Recognising the importance of reaching consensus on the “solutions” and that building
consensus takes time, the BEPS Final Report on Action 1 70 contains no solutions. It merely
describes the challenges and teases out the policy framework and potential options for addressing
both the base erosion and profit shifting issues as well as broader policy issues. The Inclusive
Framework on BEPS, working through its Task Force on the Digital Economy, carries on the
search for global solutions and published an Interim Report in March 2018, 71 a Policy Note in
January 2019, 72 a public consultation document in February 2019 73 and a Programme of Work to
Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitisation of the
Economy (Programme of Work Report) in May 2019. 74 The Programme of Work provides a
path to finding a solution in 2020 and the G20 process is expected to provide the political
momentum for its adoption. The goal is to devise rules that “should not result in taxation where
there is no economic profits nor should they result in double taxation”. 75
On the question of allocation of taxing rights (i.e., creating a new tax base nexus regime), the
Programme of Work Report describes three proposed nexus tests – user participation, marketing
intangibles, and significant economic presence. These tests posits that value is created by
users/customers or in market jurisdictions and that those jurisdictions’ taxing right is not
dependent upon the existence of a physical business presence. To attribute profit to such market
jurisdictions, the Report discusses proposals that go beyond the existing transactional,
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comparability-based transfer pricing methods and focus, instead, on the profits of a MNE group
(business line or regional segmentation). These proposals include: (a) a modified profit split
method that would allocate a portion of an MNE group’s non-routine profit to the market
jurisdiction; (b) fractional apportionment of the profit of the MNE group; (c) distribution-based
approaches, such as specifying a baseline profit in the market jurisdiction for marketing,
distribution and user-related activities. 76
On the question of tax base protection, the Programme of Work Report describes a global antibase erosion proposal that consists of two inter-related rules: a) an income inclusion rule that is
similar to the US GILTI rule – the resident country “would tax the income of a foreign branch or
a controlled entity if that income was subject to tax at an effective rate that is below a minimum
rate”; and b) a tax on base eroding payments rule that is similar to the US BEAT rules and
“would operate by way of a denial of a deduction or imposition of source-based taxation
(including withholding tax), together with any necessary changes to double tax treaties, for
certain payments unless that payment was subject to tax at or above a minimum rate.” 77

4.1.4 Harmful Tax Competition and BEPS Action 5
The value creation paradigm says that a country has the right to tax profits generated in that
country. Once a country has such taxing rights, under the principle of tax sovereignty, it can
decide not to tax such income or tax it at a preferential rate, subject to any minimum tax
consensus that may emerge. Because of the potential positive spillover effects on innovation,
economic growth and employment, many countries offer tax incentives to encourage R&D and
to earn income from patents and patent-like intangibles (i.e., the so-called “patent box” rules).
Difficulties in locating value creation and quantifying the value created in a country make it
challenging to determine if these tax incentives result in poaching another country’s tax base,
constituting harmful tax practices.
BEPS Report on Action 5 introduced a minimum standard – the substantial activity or modified
nexus requirement-- for assessing if a preferential tax regime is harmful. If a country’s
preferential tax regime grants benefits to a taxpayer to the extent that the taxpayer undertook the
core income-generating activities required to produce the income covered by the preferential
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regime, it is not deemed harmful. The nexus approach in the context of patent box regimes uses
R&D expenditure as a proxy for activity. 78

4.2 Alternative Directions – The IMF Paper
The Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy paper published by the IMF in 2019 (IMF
Paper) 79 confirms the progress made through the BEPS Project. It argues, however, tax
competition, allocation of taxing rights across countries and unilateral tax measures are among
the fundamental issues that remain unaddressed. It also considers the value creation principle to
have “proved an inadequate basis for real progress.” 80 To achieve fundamental change to current
norms, the IMF Paper proposes the following alternatives: (a) minimum taxes on outbound
investment and/or inbound investment (the latter is more pertinent for capital-importing
countries); (b) replacing the existing transfer pricing methods with a residual profit allocation
method that would allocate a normal return to source countries and split the residual profit on a
formulaic basis; (c) introducing destination-based taxation that would allocate taxing rights to
destination (market) jurisdictions. In this regard, that work is more transparent than the work to
date of the OECD/G20.
Since residual profit arises primarily from the value of intangibles and intangibles-heavy
businesses are not limited to digital companies, the IMF Paper correctly zeros in on the
allocation of residual profit as the main issue in taxing MNEs. Directionally speaking, or in
principle, the residual profit allocation proposals in the IMF Paper are similar to the modified
profit split method, fractional apportionment method and the distribution-based method in the
Programme of Work Report by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. A global consensus is critical
to the adoption of this new direction. The key to reaching such global consensus may be in the
hands of a small number of countries. According to the IMF Paper, “resident profit is highly
concentrated among a small number of firms: about one-third of all residual profit accrues to the
largest one percent … and is also concentrated among firms headquartered in a few economies
(notably the U.S., U.K., Japan, China, and Hong Kong SAR)”. 81
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4.3 Country Developments
4.3.1 United States
The introduction of the GILTI, 82 FDII 83 and BEAT 84 rules ushered in a new way of thinking
about taxing intangibles. This new thinking is reflected in how to conceptualize intangible
income and how to source it between the creation/development country and the market country.
Conceptually, the United States abandoned defining intangibles or intangible income
prescriptively. Instead, for purpose of the GILTI and FDII rules, intangible income is defined
indirectly as a residual: corporate income that is not tangible income is intangible. Tangible
income is deemed to be 10% of the adjusted tax cost of tangible depreciable property used to
produce the income. 85 In other words, intangible income does not have to come from intangible
assets. Any income exceeding the deemed tangible income is deemed to be generated by
intangibles. The residual definition applies to the value/income of the enterprise, not a specific
transaction involving intangibles. Even though the new conceptualization of intangible income is
not directly relevant to the transfer pricing rules, the effect of these new rules is to render transfer
pricing rules and the arm’s length principle less relevant. It addresses the inherent difficulty in
identifying and valuing intangibles for tax purposes.
As to sourcing or allocating intangible income, the United States adopted, in effect, a 50/50 split
of intangible income between creation/development country and market countries. Technically,
GILTI is added to the existing controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules and subject to U.S. tax,
albeit at an effective rate of 10.5% (i.e., half of the nominal corporate tax rate 86), on an
imputation basis in the hands of the U.S. shareholder. 87 If intangibles are not exploited through
foreign subsidiaries, but directly by US corporations through sales of goods or services, another
new category of income, FDII, is created. FDII is taxed at a lower effective tax rate (13.125%,
which is slightly higher than 50% of the nominal rate of 21%). When foreign-created intangibles
are exploited in the United States, the BEAT rules may apply the income from such intangibles
where it escapes US tax under the normal rules as a result of deductions for base-eroding
payments of royalties, service fees or interest to non-resident related parties. Conceptually,
GILTI and FDII look at the United States as a creation/development jurisdiction and the BEAT
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rules look at the United States as a market jurisdiction. Intangible income is sourced to both
creation/development jurisdiction and market jurisdiction on an equal footing.
The GILTI, FDII and BEAT rules provide a more simple, or one might say “elegant” solution, at
least conceptually, to taxing intangible income than the BEPS project by ignoring the fiscal
effect of contracts and legal fictions and certain traditional transactional sourcing principles. The
GILTI, FDII and BEAT function as minimum taxes, or arbitrary sourcing rules, or as defensive
measures against concentrating income in low-tax jurisdictions. They do have a certain
arbitrariness, but so do all formulary approaches.
In terms of tax competition for R&D and intangible income, the US TCJA provides an incentive
for foreign-based MNEs to locate R&D activities and holding of intangibles in the United States
through FDII rules as the lower tax rate is competitive, even compared to countries with patent
box regimes. On the other hand, the TCJA will change the expensing of R&D expenditures
regime to a five-year amortization regime, starting in 2022. 88
4.3.2 United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has introduced some reforms concerning intangibles, including the diverted
profits tax, the revised patent box rule, deduction of cost of intangible fixed assets and digital
service tax.
The Diverted Profits Tax was introduced in Finance Act 2015 89 as a base-protection measure. It
targets large MNEs that use so-called “contrived” arrangements to avoid UK tax through taking
advantage of existing transfer pricing rules, permanent establishment test or mismatches. It
protects the UK taxing rights over intangible income in circumstances where the UK is a market
jurisdiction, such as where: (a) a UK resident company pays royalties or service fees to an
intermediary intangibles holding company in a low-tax jurisdiction in respect of intangibles
created/developed by a company in the United States; or (b) UK customers pay for the use of
intangibles or purchasing intangibles-embedded goods or services. 90 The Diverted Profits Tax
also seeks to protect the UK tax base where the UK is a creation/development jurisdiction in
cases such as the following:
[A] UK company (UKCo) trades across Europe in the development, manufacturing and
selling of widgets. UKCo owns all intellectual property (IP) related to the widget. UKCo
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jointly develops new patentable IP with a third party company in the UK. UKCo has the
opportunity to buy out the third party once the development is completed. A group
decision is made to establish a new connected company in a low tax jurisdiction (IPCo)
and funds are made available to IPCo to acquire the patentable IP which will
subsequently be licensed back to UKCo. IPCo provides IP protection and management
activities in relation to the IP and takes the associated risk of ownership. IPCo then
charges a royalty to UKCo for access to the patents. 91
As a member of the OECD, the UK has effectively imported the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines into its transfer pricing rules by explicitly requiring the Guidelines to be used in
interpreting the domestic rules. 92 For accounting periods beginning after 1 April 2018 the 2017
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines are now explicitly incorporated into UK law. The profit split
method is the commonly used method in assessing highly integrated businesses or transactions
involving valuable intangibles.
The UK uses tax incentives to encourage R&D in the UK as well as to locate intangible income
in the UK. The Intangible Fixed Assets regime introduced in 2002 applies to intangible fixed
assets (including goodwill) created or acquired from an unrelated party. It allows a deduction
from income for capitalised expenditure at a rate of 6.5% per annum in respect of assets acquired
on or after 1 April, 2019. Qualifying assets include patents, registered designs, copyright or
design rights, plant breeders’ rights or a license (excluding a license for the use of computer
software). 93 The UK patent box scheme was introduced in April 2013 and allows UK companies
to elect to pay a reduced rate of corporate tax on profits derived from the exploitation of patents
and certain other types of intellectual property (e.g., supplementary protection certificates for
pharmaceutical products). In response to the BEPS Action 5 Report, the UK revised the patent
box regime in 2016 by incorporating a modified nexus approach by which the amount of tax
relief available will depend on the extent to which the R&D leading to the patented invention (or
a product embodying it) was carried out in the UK.
The UK has proposed an interim digital service tax to take effect from April 2020. It is a 2%
excise tax on revenues derived from UK customers for using/participating social media
platforms, search engines or online marketplaces. 94
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4.3.3 Japan
Japan has recently implemented BEPS measures regarding country-by-country reporting,
earnings stripping, CFC and transfer pricing. 95 With respect to transfer pricing, Japan has
incorporated BEPS Report on Actions 8-10 (and thus 2017 OECD Guidelines) as well as the
2018 Revised Guidance on hard-to-value intangibles. 96 It has added the discounted cash flow
method as a new transfer pricing methodology. This method will be used as a basis for
presumptive taxation by the tax authorities. The tax authorities are authorized to make an
assessment for transactions involving hard-to-value intangibles to the extent that the ex post
valuation outcome differs by 20% or more from the actual transaction value (based on the ex
ante valuation). Exceptions for such assessment apply where a taxpayer submits documents that
prove the difficulties of an accurate ex ante valuation by showing, for example, the discrepancy
was de to a disaster or similar event that was difficult to predict or that the arm’s length price
was calculated by taking the probability of the event into consideration.
Japanese CFC rules may also affect the taxation of intangibles. 97 In 2017, Japan included in CFC
rules all income that is earned by a foreign related company that is a paper company, a cash box,
or a blacklist company 98 that is subject to a corporate tax rate of less than 30 percent of the Japan
tax rate. All the CFC income calculations are made at the entity level basis. The 2019 tax reform
expanded the definition of cash box company by including a company with insurance premiums
from unrelated parties of less than 10% of gross premiums and narrowed the definition of paper
company by excluding specified holding companies that have substantive economic activities.
Japan offers R&D tax credits to corporations. 99 Recent tax reforms have enhanced these tax
credits. For example, the 2017 tax reform expanded the scope of eligible R&D expenses to
include development costs for the Internet of Things, big data and artificial intelligence. The
2019 tax reform increased the tax credit limitation from 25% of corporate income tax liability to
40% and eligible expenses for the open innovation type of R&D credit is extended to contract
R&D provided by large-sized enterprises. Japan does not have a patent box regime.
4.3.4 China
Chinese taxation of intangibles is, in principle, consistent with the norms reflected in the OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the spirit of the BEPS Project, reflecting the arm’s length principle
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and the value creation idea. The definition of intangibles is aligned with the BEPS Report on
Actions 8-10. However, the Chinese approach to applying the arm’s length principle and
determining value creation is less constrained by contractual terms and conditions and the
existence of separate entities. It allows the use of more flexible, enterprise-based profit methods
and emphasizes functions performed in China 100 by adhering to the doctrine of substance-overform. 101
In addition to the five methods in the OECD Guidelines, the State Taxation Administration has
the power to use any other reasonable methods, 102 including: “the cost method, the market
method, the income method and other asset appraisal methods, as well as other methods that can
reflect the principle of profit-matching the places where the profit and economic activities occur
and where the value is created.” 103 In the case of intangibles, a value contribution method is
sanctioned. Under this method, the consolidated profits of an MNE group are allocated across the
value chain to members of the group located in different countries based on an analysis of how
the value creation contributions have been made to such group profits.
The Chinese transfer pricing practice focuses more on value contribution through functions
performed, risks assumed and assets used in the business operations. In allocating residual profit,
not only firm-specific intangibles are considered, but also location-specific advantages, such as
location savings and market premium. 104 In addition to the DEMPE (development, enhancement,
maintenance, protection and exploitation) functions recognized in the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines, China considers “promotion” as an important function regarding market-related
intangibles. China also regards global value chain analysis 105 to be very important:
When determining the contribution made to the value of intangibles and the
corresponding allocation of returns to the enterprise and its related parties, a
comprehensive analysis should be conducted on various value creation factors, including
the global operation processes of the enterprise group, fully considering the value
contribution made by each party to the development, enhancement, maintenance,
protection, exploitation and promotion of the intangibles, how the value of the intangibles
is realized, and the interaction of the intangibles with other functions, assets and risks of
the other business within the enterprise group.
Participants that are merely the legal owners of the intangibles, without making any
contribution to the value of the intangibles, should not be entitled to share any returns
derived from the intangibles. Participants that only contribute funding or capital, without
performing any functions or assuming corresponding risks in the development and
exploitation of the intangibles, should only be entitled to a reasonable return on capital. 106
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Base-eroding royalty payments are expected to reflect changes to the functions performed, risks
assumed or assets employed by the enterprise and its related parties during the exploitation of the
intangibles. 107 Any royalty paid by an enterprise to an entity that is merely the legal owner of the
intangibles, without making any contribution to the value of the intangibles may be denied of
deduction in computing Chinese taxable income.
Income from China-created intangibles is taxable in China to the extent that it is earned by a
Chinese resident enterprise. Where such income is earned by a foreign corporation, it is taxable
in China only when the income is repatriated to China by way of dividends. China’s CFC rules
do not currently apply to intangible income per se. 108
China offers tax incentives to the creation/development and exploitation of intangibles. For
example, 150% of actual R&D expenditures are deductible. 109 Income from transfer of
qualifying technology may be exempt from tax or taxed at half of the nominal corporate tax rate
of 25%. 110 Income of “advanced and new technology” enterprises is taxed at the reduced rate of
15%. 111

5 NEXT STEPS FOR CANADA
5.1. Status quo in a disruptive world?
The rapid and significant changes at the global level and country level suggest that doing nothing
is unlikely a wise option for Canada. It is true that Canada has actively participated in the BEPS
Project and implemented some of the BEPS measures, such as country-by-country reporting and
is a signatory to the [MLI]. It is also true that Canada, being a member of the OECD and
neighbor to the United States, has limited options available. But, the status quo may not serve
Canada’s interest as effectively as it should in terms of defining and protecting Canada’s taxing
rights and competing with other countries for R&D activities and intangible income location.
There are also no easy choices among: a) the BEPS approach to transfer pricing and OECD
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, which have been explicitly incorporated into domestic legislation in
Australia, Japan and UK; b) BEPS proposals regarding digital taxation and broader reform
proposals in the IMF Paper; c) US taxation of intangibles through minimum taxes; and d) the
Chinese approach though value-contribution based methodology cloaked in the pragmatic
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interpretation of the arm’s length principle. What follows are some tentative ideas for
exploration.

5.2 Value Creation and the Canadian notion of source
The value creation idea could be said to have been reflected in the Canadian income tax system
since its inception, despite the fact that the Act does not define “source” or prescribe specific
source rules. 112 The Income War Tax Act (1917) adopted two proxies for Canadian source
business profits: Canadian residence of a company (which nominally goes beyond source but
with foreign tax credits and the exemption regime effectively doesn’t) and carrying on business
in Canada by non-residents. Before royalties earned by non-resident became taxed under the
withholding tax regime in 1948, they were deemed to be income from carrying on business in
Canada. 113 In order to protect this notion of source, the Income War Tax Act and the Act contain
numerous anti-avoidance rules, including transfer pricing and FAPI in regard to deflected
Canadian business profits.
However, the existing rules reflect value creation factors of an agricultural and industrial
economy. For example, paragraphs 253(a) and (b) mention “produces, grows, mines, creates,
manufactures, fabricates, improves, packs, preserves or constructs, in whole or in part, anything
in Canada” and “solicits orders or offers anything for sale in Canada through an agent or
servant”. Should Canada wish to tax certain revenues derived from a digital economy, these
provisions can be amended to add activities or manifestation of value (such as user/customer
participation, or even just revenues). The withholding tax rules could conceivably be broadened
to capture income from exploiting intangibles that are not current captured by paragraph
212(1)(d) and certain base-eroding payments. However, the somewhat ironic position must be
acknowledged that Canada, like many other countries, has for decades exempted certain royalties
– presumably in order to facilitate access to the relevant intangibles, or just for practical reasons
(such as in the context of “shrink-wrapped” intangibles).
While the inbound rules mentioned above could be improved to ensure Canadian taxation of
Canadian-source intangible income or revenues, the outbound rules may also receive some
rethinking. The current rules separate corporate income into three main pools: passive property
income, foreign active business income, and Canadian base eroding business income. Intangible
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income derived by entities of an MNE group is generally in the active business income pool
under the FAPI and foreign affiliate rules. If the subsequent income derived from Canadiancreated intangibles with tax subsidies falls outside the Canadian corporate tax base when it is
earned and when it is repatriated, such outcome can be justified as a tax subsidy to holding and
exploiting intangibles outside Canada. Unless this is a deliberate policy decision to retain the
status quo, Canada could try to capture a greater portion of the intangible income.

5.3 Residual Profit and Canadian Transfer Pricing Rules
On the basis of Canadian case law on transfer pricing, the courts seem to have treated section
247 as a kind of prescriptive rule and not given it a broader interpretation as a general rule
intended to protect Canadian-source business profits. The origin of section 247 is section 3(2) of
the Income War Tax Act (1917). Adjusting related- party transaction prices was a means of
ensuring that Canadian profits were not shifted to another country through self-serving contracts
between the two parties. Section 247(2) was drafted broadly and avoided using the word “price”.
The Act, as a whole, has an ambivalent attitude towards legal fictions 114 and many corporate tax
rules were intended to render, in effect, the separate corporate existence irrelevant for tax
purposes. A broader interpretation of section 247 is possible and could, arguably, address the
issue of residual profit attributable to intangibles. However, there is little indication that
Canadian courts would be prepared to adopt such approach. To ensure the transfer pricings are
effective, Canada should consider clarifying the role of OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines in
interpreting section 247 At a minimum, Canada should clarify its current position on “cashboxes” and “minimally functional entities”, and any change should be applied only
prospectively, as with the changes to the US rules and others. Canada should also consider
reforms on the incentive side – or at least seek to balance in some ways tax base considerations
with competitiveness and efficiency considerations.
In brief, while the status quo may be inadequate, Canada has difficult but important decisions to
make with respect to the future, which it should approach with caution but also with an open
mind.
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